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WHY A MONKEY’S ACTION OF TAKING A SELFIE  
SHOULD EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF AN  
AUTHOR IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
David Schneider* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, wildlife photographer David Slater set up a camera on 
an island in Indonesia and hoped to capture a picture of the Celebes 
Crested Macaque, an endangered monkey species indigenous to 
Indonesia.1  Naruto, a six-year old Celebes Crested Macaque, came 
upon Slater’s camera and took multiple pictures of himself.2  Naruto, 
considered “highly intelligent,” familiarized himself with the operation 
of the camera by observing humans who used the camera.3  Multiple 
parties, including the parties who filed a lawsuit on Naruto’s behalf, 
claimed copyright to one particular photograph, informally known as 
the “Monkey Selfie.”4  Subsequently, the People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (hereinafter “PETA”) and Antje Engelhardt 
filed a complaint against Slater in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California alleging that Slater infringed 
Naruto’s copyright in the photograph.5  The court granted Slater’s 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2019; Stony Brook 
University, B.A. in United States History.  Special Thanks: To Professor Jorge Roig for 
overseeing and advising me on the topic.  To Professor Rena Seplowitz for her constant 
encouragement.  To Joseph Tromba for his edits and assistance with this paper.  To my family 
for all the support they have given me.  Finally, I dedicate this paper to all animals without a 
voice or legal recourse that are constantly exploited.   
1 Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 




5 Id.  Plaintiff alleged that Slater falsely claimed authorship of the photograph, and violated 
the copyright by displaying, selling, and advertising copies of the photograph.  
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motion to dismiss because “the Copyright Act [did] not confer standing 
upon animals like Naruto.”6  
The Copyright Act (hereinafter “the Act”) does not specifically 
define who is protected by copyright.7  Rather, the Act broadly states 
that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”8  Congress enacted the 
Copyright Act of 1976 to preserve and promote artistic creations by 
giving legal recourse to those whose work is copied and exploited.9  
Although the Act does not specifically identify those entitled to 
copyright protection, based on a combination of case law precedent 
and the United States Copyright Office’s interpretation of the Act, 
courts have refused to recognize that higher intelligence animals, such 
as monkeys, can create original works of authorship fixed in tangible 
media of expression, such as photographs.10  However, such 
interpretation of the Act directly conflicts with Congress’s overall 
intent when it implemented the copyright system in the United States.11   
Animals can create new works of art, which should be 
protected by copyright to prevent humans from exploiting them for 
personal profit.12  Because of the combination of ever-increasing 
public interest in protecting animals and their rights with scientific 
discoveries based on the intelligence of animals, animals should be 
afforded similar protections in copyright as humans.13  Courts should 
expand the definition of “works of authorship” to include works 
created by higher intelligence animals, such as monkeys, dolphins, 
pigs, crows, raccoons, and elephants, who have demonstrated that they 
 
6 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court’s reasoning 
and affirmed the court’s decision.  Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420. 
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).  
8 § 102.  The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 See § 101. 
10 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *3. 
11 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  
12 See generally Jason G. Goldman, Creativity: The Weird and Wonderful Art of Animals, 
BBC (July 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140723-are-we-the-only-creative-
species. 
13 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *4. 
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can communicate with humans in some form or another and 
understand human technology.14   
Part II of this Note introduces the case Naruto v. Slater, which 
PETA and Engelhardt brought in the Northern District of California on 
behalf of Naruto.  This Part also discusses the subsequent history of 
the case, which includes an appeal and settlement.  Part III examines 
the Copyright Act of 1976 and analyzes Congress’s intent when it 
enacted the statute.  This Part also explains why courts should interpret 
the statute to protect original works of authorship in animals.  Part IV 
argues that courts should disregard the Copyright Compendium’s 
interpretation that an author needs to be a human being.  Part V 
discusses the Northern District of California’s flawed reasoning in 
Naruto.  Part VI discusses recommendations for courts to use in the 
future when dealing with similar animal rights issues.  Part VII 
evaluates the Copyright Act and provides examples where the Act 
itself provides protections for animals.  Finally, Part VIII concludes 
that animals should be permitted to bring copyright infringement 
lawsuits because they can create original works of authorship. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE 
This section discusses the trial court’s decision in the Northern 
District of California, the appeal brought by PETA on Naruto’s behalf, 
and the settlement reached by the parties.  The trial court denied Naruto 
protection under the Copyright Act because it held that human beings 
have standing under the Act, not animals.  After an appeal by PETA, 
the parties settled favorably for both sides.  This section discusses the 
court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs’ arguments, and how the parties settled 
the case.  
A. Trial Court’s Decision in the Northern District of 
California 
In 2011, David Slater, a wildlife photographer, set up a camera 
on a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia, to capture a picture 
of the endangered Celebes Crested Macaque species that are 
 
14 Id. at *1; Leyre Castro & Ed Wasserman, Crows Understand Analogies: What Birds Can 
Teach Us about Animal Intelligence, SCI. AM. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican 
.com/article/crows-understand-analogies/. 
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indigenous to Indonesia.15  Naruto, a six-year old Celebes Crested 
Macaque, came upon Slater’s camera and took multiple pictures of 
himself.16  Multiple parties claimed copyright to one particular 
photograph, which became informally known as the “Monkey Selfie,” 
including parties representing the Celebes Crested Macaque.17  Naruto, 
represented by PETA and Antje Engelhardt (Next Friends), brought a 
copyright infringement claim against Slater and Blurb, Inc., the 
company that published a book containing the Monkey Selfie.18  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated sections 106 and 501 of 
the Copyright Act by displaying, advertising, and selling the Monkey 
Selfie.19  The plaintiffs sought damages, in the form of profits from 
previous uses of the Monkey Selfie, and an injunction to prevent the 
defendants from any additional use of the selfie.20  Section 106 states 
that “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to 
do and to authorize any of the following . . . to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phono records; . . . to distribute copies 
or phono records of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending.”21  Section 501(a) 
states:  
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 
122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or 
who imports copies or phonorecords into the United 
States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the 
copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.22 
Section 501(b) provides that “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an 
exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action 
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she 
is the owner of it.”23  Under these two sections, the plaintiffs asserted 
 
15 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016). 
22 Id. § 501(a). 
23 Id. § 501(b). 
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that Naruto is the rightful copyright owner and, thus, Slater and Blurb, 
Inc. infringed Naruto’s copyright.24  
The court considered Naruto to be “highly intelligent,” and 
familiar with people and tourists because of the location of his habitat 
on the reserve.25  Naruto, at the time, was familiar with the way a 
camera operates.26  He was also familiar with cameras because he had 
previously observed humans using the camera.27  Through observation, 
Naruto familiarized himself with the mechanisms of the camera and 
developed a sense of trust towards humans.28  The trial court opined 
that Naruto authored the selfie by “independent, autonomous action . . 
. understanding the cause-and-effect relationship between pressing the 
shutter release, the noise of the shutter, and the change of his reflection 
in the camera lens.”29 
Defendant moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Naruto 
lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and 
the Copyright Act of 1976.30  The trial court did not address the 
constitutional issue of standing under Article III because it ruled that 
Naruto lacked standing under the Copyright Act of 1976.31  However, 
the trial court noted that in Cetacean Community v. Bush “[t]he Ninth 
Circuit has stated that Article III ‘does not compel the conclusions that 
a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a “case or 
controversy.”’”32  The Ninth Circuit stated that a reading of the text of 
Article III of the United States Constitution does not explicitly limit 
the ability to bring a claim in federal court solely to humans.33  Thus, 
based on the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Article III, Naruto would 
have standing under Article III of the Constitution.34 
While Naruto may have standing under the Constitution, he 
lacked standing under the Copyright Act based on the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
24 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  
25 Id. at *4. 
26 Id. at *1.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  
30 Id. at *2.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
33 Id. 
34 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2. 
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ruling in Cetacean Community.35  The trial court rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that the Copyright Act is available to anyone and ruled that 
the Ninth Circuit had already ruled on this issue of animal standing 
under the Copyright Act in Cetacean Community.36  The Ninth Circuit 
analyzed the Copyright Act to determine whether animals have 
standing under the Act, but it was unable to find congressional intent 
regarding this issue.37  Since the Copyright Act did not explicitly state 
animals could claim authorship, and previous courts’ rulings had 
repeatedly referred to humans when determining authorship, the trial 
court determined that animals did not have standing to bring a claim 
under the Copyright Act.38  Finally, the trial court turned to the United 
States Copyright Office Practices of 2014, known as the Copyright 
Compendium, which specifically addressed the issue of human 
authorship regarding the Copyright Act.39   
Courts had previously looked to, and continue to look to, the 
Compendium for guidance on issues that are ambiguous in the 
copyright statutes.40  As taken from the manual, the purpose of the 
Compendium was to serve as “the administrative manual of the 
Register of Copyrights concerning Title 17 of the United States Code 
and Chapter 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”41  The Copyright 
Compendium “provides guidance to agency staff regarding their 
statutory duties and provides expert guidance to applicants, 
practitioners, scholars, the courts, and members of the general public 
regarding institutional practices and related principles of law.”42  The 
Compendium covers “the many technical requirements, regulations 
and legal interpretations of the U.S. Copyright Office . . . [and] 
provides guidance regarding the contents and scope of particular 
registrations and records.”43  The Compendium states, “The U.S. 
Copyright Office will register an original work of authorship, provided 
 
35 Id.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cetacean Community was binding on the Northern 
District of California when it decided Naruto. 
36 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2.  
37 Id. at *3.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *4.  
40 Id. 
41 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 1 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.copy 
right.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf. 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
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that the work was created by a human being.”44  Further, the 
Compendium states that works that humans did not create are not 
copyrightable.45  Relying on the Compendium, the court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss because Naruto lacked standing under 
the Copyright Act.46  The court reasoned that his photograph was not 
entitled to copyright because he was an animal.47  The court explained 
that the issue of whether an animal has standing under the Copyright 
Act should be left to Congress through legislation or the President, 
presumably through executive order.48 
B. The Appeal and Settlement 
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court, 
challenging the decision that human authorship is required for standing 
to bring a claim under the Copyright Act.49  However, the parties 
reached a settlement agreement prior to a decision by the court and 
requested that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismiss the 
earlier decision stating that animals cannot own a copyright.50  Under 
the settlement agreement, Slater agreed to donate approximately 25% 
of any future revenue from the photo to groups that are dedicated to 
protecting the macaques and their reserves in Indonesia.51  An 
evaluation of the settlement agreement would suggest that the 
settlement was more favorable to Naruto.52  This settlement agreement 
should serve as a guide for future animal copyright cases.53  The 
 
44 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 4. 
45 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 4. 
46 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *4. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (No. 16-15469), 2016 
WL 4089357, at *1. 
50 Jason Slotkin, ‘Monkey Selfie’ Lawsuits Ends with Settlement Between PETA, 
Photographer, NPR (Sept. 12, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/ 
2017/09/12/550417823/-animal-rights-advocates-photographer-compromise-over-
ownership-of-monkey-selfie.  Despite the settlement, the Ninth Circuit answered the questions 
anyway and affirmed the trial court.  See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (2018). 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  The article does not explicitly state that Naruto won the case, but the terms of the 
settlement suggest that Naruto won in the end.  
53 Id.  The agreement reached between the parties seems to be a fair compromise to all 
parties involved and should serve as a guideline for future cases.  The settlement considers the 
interest that would be most beneficial to Naruto and the species as a whole, and did not deprive 
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settlement agreement seemingly provided animals with certain rights 
that the courts generally have not enumerated.  Further, both parties 
apparently disagreed with the decision of the court to deny copyright 
protection to the plaintiff.  This settlement agreement provides a 
perfect balance between fairness and logic.  Animals do not intend to 
create art because they do not understand the concept; however, 
without human intervention, their art would never be seen by others 
even though its creation may have been unintentional.  Animals are not 
known to put their “art” on display; thus, a human would be required 
to put that “art” on display for the world to see.  As such, this settlement 
agreement provides both sides with fair compensation, because both 
parties were involved in the creation and popularization of the image. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND WHY IT 
SHOULD INCLUDE ANIMALS 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act to protect “original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known 
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”54  The initial ownership clause of the Act states that a 
“[c]opyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work.”55  The Act does not define the term “author” or “authors,” but 
the Supreme Court has previously defined the term “author” with 
respect to copyrights.56  
It is well established in the case law developed by the Supreme 
Court that the determination of the author of a work protected by 
copyright should be in the broadest terms possible.57  Under this 
definition, Naruto, and thus animals in general, can be authors of 
original expressions of work, because Naruto, as well as animals in 
general, are capable of creating works of authorship fixed in tangible 
 
Slater of all his income from the photo.  Slater’s claim to the copyright was based on the facts 
that the photograph was taken with his camera and Naruto is an animal.  
54 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016). 
55 Id. § 201(a). 
56 See generally id. § 101.  The definition of the word “author” is absent from the definition 
section of the statute, but it is used throughout the section. 
57 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).  The case does not 
specifically define what the Court meant by “broad” but it stated, “We entertain no doubt that 
the constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far 
as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”  Id. 
8
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media.58  Naruto, by explicitly stating that he is the author of the 
photograph, has been declared the author of the Monkey Selfie.59  
Thus, the only question that remains is whether the Act provides an 
animal with copyright protection.60  Although the statute does not 
provide whether an animal can be an author entitled to copyright 
protection, the courts’ broad construction of author supports such an 
interpretation.61 
In 1884, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the 
term “author,” in the context of copyright, should be interpreted as 
broadly as possible.62  The Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining whether the defendant, a photographer, infringed the 
copyright of the plaintiff, a lithographer, regarding a photograph.63  In 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, the Court reasoned that the 
“‘author,’ ‘inventor,’ and ‘designer,’ as used in the art of photography 
. . . mean the person who so produced the photograph.”64  The Court 
elaborated that “[a]n author in that sense is ‘he to whom anything owes 
its origin; originator; maker, one who completes a work of science or 
literature.’”65  The Supreme Court in this case explicitly did not use the 
word “human” or “person” to describe an author but instead used the 
words “originator” and “maker.”66  As seen throughout the entire 
opinion, the Supreme Court never made a reference to the fact that a 
human is required.67  The Court used gender pronouns to describe 
authors, but these gender pronouns can be applied to monkeys as well 
as humans.68 
In 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed this concept of a broad 
interpretation of authorship in Goldstein v. California,69 by stating 
“[w]hile an author may be viewed as an individual who writes an 
original composition, the term, in its constitutional sense, has been 
 
58 See generally id.  The Supreme Court does not explicitly exclude animals from being 
considered authors. 
59 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  
60 Id. at *2.  
61 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 54. 
64 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 55. 
65 Id. at 57-58. 
66 Id. at 58.  
67 See generally id. at 53.  
68 Id. at 58-60.  
69 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
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construed to mean an originator, he to whom anything owes its 
origin.”70  In 1989, the Supreme Court once again affirmed its 
expansive definition of the term “author” in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid.71  The Supreme Court, quoting the Copyright 
Act of 1976, stated that “ownership vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work.”72  The Court also quoted the Copyright Act 
stating, “[a]s a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates 
the work.”73  The Court once again explicitly avoided using human and 
instead defined authors as parties.74  This broad definition of 
authorship, which the Supreme Court tends to favor, supports the the 
argument that animals should be included in the broad definition.  
Under the Copyright Act, Naruto, and all animals who create new 
artistic expression, should have standing to survive a motion to dismiss 
their claims based on lack of standing.75  Because the Supreme Court 
did not explicitly exclude animals from being considered authors in its 
decisions in Burrow-Giles and Goldstein, the Court demonstrated its 
acceptance that humans should not be the only class of animals for 
which their works of authorship can be protected by copyright.76 
Courts interpret statutes and often turn to the legislative intent behind 
statutes when a term is unclear from the plain language of the statute.77 
The Supreme Court has long established the authority to 
determine the legislative intent of Congress when a statute’s terms are 
unclear.78  In one of the most important and defining cases of American 
history, the Supreme Court ruled in Marbury v. Madison79 that the 
Court has the authority to review laws passed by Congress to 
determine if they conflict with the Constitution.80  In Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
 
70 Id. at 562.  Petitioners were charged with copying several musical performances from 
commercially sold recordings without permission of the owner.  
71 See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).  
72 Id. at 735. 
73 Id. at 737.  
74 Id. at 736-37.  While the Court was not contemplating animals in this decision, their word 
choice suggests that they desired a broad definition of authorship.  
75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).  The Copyright Act does not explicitly state animals should have 
rights to a copyright; however, it does not limit the reach of its protection to just humans.  Id. 
76 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see also 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).   
77 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 602-03 (2008).  
78 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 179-80. 
10
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“the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its 
purpose are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative 
intent.”81  This power, which has been upheld until the present day,82 
was further expanded in District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that in cases of ambiguity regarding 
congressional and legislative intent, the Court may determine the intent 
of the framers of the law or statute.83   
The power of determining legislative intent has long been 
vested in the powers of the court system.84  On multiple occasions, the 
Court has had the opportunity to address this issue of whether a non-
human can hold a copyright, but has declined  every time.85  The lower 
courts have also avoided addressing the issue of a non-human holding 
a copyright.  In particular, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine 
whether a copyright owner can bring an infringement claim for a book 
consisting of revelations allegedly received from celestial beings.86  
The court analyzed the issue of whether the Urantia Foundation could 
be considered the copyright owner of a book called the Urantia Book, 
which was compiled and collected by humans, but claimed to be 
authored by celestial beings.87  The Urantia Foundation brought suit 
against Kristen Maaherra, alleging that Maaherra infringed Urantia’s 
copyright when she redistributed the Foundation’s book on  disk.88  
The district court ruled in favor of Maaherra because Urantia failed to 
properly renew its copyright.89  On the renewal form, Urantia claimed 
that the book fell under the “made for hire” provision of the Copyright 
Act, which stated that the employer owns the copyright if made by an 
employee during his employment.90  Essentially, Urantia was claiming 
that the celestial being was an employee of the foundation.91  The court 
granted Urantia’s claim for copyright protection and denied ruling on 
the issue that the book was not “made for hire” because Urantia would 
 
81 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979). 
82 The Supreme Court has not overturned Marbury v. Madison. 
83 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
84 See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.  Marbury has been upheld since its ruling in 1804. 
85 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53; see also Goldstein, 412 
U.S. at 546; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
86 See generally Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997).  
87 Id. at 956. 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 957.  
91 Urantia, 114 F.3d at 957. 
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have succeeded on the merits even if such claim was false.92  Thus, the 
court held that Urantia’s copyright claim was valid.93   
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit addressed Maaherra’s 
claim that Urantia did not have a valid copyright in the Urantia Book 
because “it lacks the requisite ingredient of human creativity, and that 
therefore the Book is not a ‘work of authorship’ within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act.”94  The court stated that the copyright laws “do not 
expressly require human authorship, and considerable controversy has 
arisen in recent years over the copyrightability of computer-generated 
work.”95  The court further stated that “at the very least, for a worldly 
entity to be guilty of infringing a copyright, that entity must have 
copied something created by another worldly entity.”96  The court in 
this case recognized that authorship does not need to be human in order 
to be protectable under the Copyright Act but must be a worldly entity, 
a term which the court did not define.97  By analogy, a monkey-
generated artistic expression is similar to a computer-generated artistic 
expression because both a computer and a monkey are worldly 
entities.98  The court’s hesitation to declare that an animal, or in 
general, a non-human, has no standing under the Copyright Act 
showed, in part, that an animal can have standing.99  The lack of 
making such a decision explicitly demonstrates that the court, which 
had the power to determine congressional intent, did not fully agree 
that the Copyright Act applies to only humans.100  If Congress intended 
for humans to be the only entities whose works could be protected by 
copyright, then it would have explicitly stated so in the statutes, or 
 
92 Id. at 962-63.  Made for hire work is work that is created by an employee as part of their 
employment.  Even if Urantia’s claim that the celestial being was an employee of the 
foundation was false, the Court still would have ruled in their favor based on the merits of the 
case.  
93 Id. at 963.  
94 Id. at 958. 
95 Id. 
96 Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958. 
97 Id. 
98 Entity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity (last 
visited June 28, 2018).  The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines entity as “being, existence; 
especially; independent, separate, or self-contained existence.  The existence of a thing as 
contrasted with its attributes.  Something that has a separate and distinct existence and 
objective or conceptual reality.”  Id. 
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courts would have expressly ruled so in accordance with congressional 
intent when it enacted the Act.101  
The courts have addressed a similar situation in which the 
copyright owner is unable to make decisions, such as minors who, by 
law, are deemed unable to make sound, legal decisions.102  The United 
States District Court of Arizona analyzed the issue of whether a minor 
could own a copyright.103  Barbara Mason was seventeen years old 
when she authored her own song and composition.104  Although Mason 
was a minor at the time that the copyright was granted, the court 
concluded that she was the rightful owner of the copyright.105   
In 2015, in I.C. ex rel Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA,106 the 
Southern District of New York ruled that a minor could allege 
copyright infringement of an original artistic expression.107  I.C. 
submitted a design for a girl’s clothing brand for a contest that was 
based on the originality of a design.108  I.C. won the contest but never 
received any compensation based on her design.109  The court shed 
light on the issue of when a copyright is denied by the U.S. Copyright 
Office and the protections afforded to a denied copyright.110  The court 
ruled that when the Copyright Office denies a copyright, there are two 
possible courses of action.111  The denied party can seek to overturn 
the Copyright Office’s denial or may proceed under the Copyright Act 
§ 411(a), which allows reevaluation of validity.112  In this case, whether 
the copyright was valid or not, protection was afforded to non-minors 
and minors.113  This situation is analogous to animal copyrights 
because, similar to minors, animals are unable to bring claims on their 
 
101 See generally id. Artificial intelligence can be considered a “worldly entity” by 
definition.  An animal can also be considered to be a worldly entity and, therefore, able to hold 
a copyright under this definition.  
102 See generally Mason v. Jamie Music Publ’g Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
103 Id. at 574-75. 
104 Id. at 575. 
105 Id. at 587. 
106 135 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
107 Id. at 215. 
108 Id. at 203. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 206. 
111 Delta Galil, 135 F. Supp. 3d. at 213. 
112 Id.  Section 411(a) states that when registration is refused, the alleged owner is entitled 
to institute a civil action for infringement.  The Register may become a party to the action with 
respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2016). 
113 See generally Delta Galil, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 196.  The court ruled on the basis of unjust 
enrichment.  
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own without assistance of a non-minor.114  Minors and animals share 
many similar characteristics regarding copyrights.115  Minors and 
animals both have the capabilities of creating original works of artistic 
expression, both require an adult human being to bring suit on their 
behalf, and both classes are worldly entities.116  Based on these 
similarities, animals should be afforded the same copyright protections 
as minors.117  
IV. THE COURTS SHOULD DISREGARD THE COMPENDIUM’S 
INTERPRETATION THAT AN AUTHOR NEEDS TO BE HUMAN 
The Copyright Compendium is not the governing law when 
determining the eligibility of a worldly entity to hold a copyright.  As 
previously stated, the Copyright Compendium is released by the 
United States Copyright Office to provide legal guidance regarding 
copyright law and related copyright matters.118  In the “Standard of 
Deference” section of the Compendium, the drafters admit that “the 
Compendium does not override any existing statute or regulation.”119  
The drafters recognized that the “policies and practices set forth in the 
Compendium do not in themselves have the force and effect of law and 
are not binding upon the Register of the Copyrights or U.S. Copyright 
Office staff.”120  The Compendium states that “[t]he Supreme Court 
recognized that courts may consider the interpretations set forth in 
administrative manuals, policy statements, and similar materials to the 
extent that those interpretations have the power to persuade.”121  
Finally, the drafters state “[t]he weight of the agency’s judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
 
114 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  As discussed, this suit was brought on Naruto’s behalf 
by PETA and Engelhardt. 
115 See generally Mason v. Jamie Music Publ’g Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1)(A)-(D) (stating “The following representatives may sue or 
defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a 
committee; (C) a conservator; or (D) a like fiduciary”). 
117 Both minors and animals require a guardian because they lack the basic competency 
needed to initiate a lawsuit.  
118 See discussion of the Copyright Compendium supra Part I.  
119 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
120 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
121 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (citing 
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000)).  
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and later pronouncements, and all those factors to which it gives power 
to persuade.”122 
The Compendium lists numerous copyright cases where the 
courts have given the Compendium deference.123  The cases listed 
range from disclaiming preexisting works, registration requirements 
for databases, registration requirements for collective works, and 
publication regulation.124  The Compendium cites to the Southern 
District of Texas court’s view in the case Rogers v. Better Business 
Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc.125  Citing to this case, the 
Compendium states that “policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines do not carry the force of law but they are 
entitled to some deference given the specialized experience and 
broader investigations and information of the agency.”126  In this 
section, courts give great weight to the Compendium for registration 
requirements, but courts have not cited to any case law in which the 
Compendium has been used to determine legislative intent.127  
Congress enacts each statute with a specific legislative intent, and it is 
up to the courts to interpret Congress’s intent when a statute is 
unclear.128   
The U.S. Copyright Office exceeded its administrative power 
by interpreting the legislative intent of the Copyright Act, which 
should have been left to the courts.129  The power to determine statutory 
interpretation has already been conferred on the judicial branch of the 
United States in Marbury.130  In Marbury, Justice Marshall stated that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”131  The power of legislative interpretation lies 
within the judicial branch, but the Compendium has weakened the 
power of the courts by improperly interpreting statutes as an 
 
122 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
123 See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
124 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
125 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (citing 887 F. 
Supp. 2d 722, 732 (S.D. Tex. 2012)). 
126 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2 (quoting 
Rogers, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 732). 
127 See generally COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41, at 2. 
128 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
129 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
130 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78.  
131 Id. at 177. 
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administrative entity as opposed to a judicial entity.132  The Supreme 
Court has given some weight to administrative statutory interpretation, 
but only pertaining to cases of ambiguity.133 
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,134 the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the “EPA’s 
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices 
within the same industrial grouping . . . is based on a reasonable 
construction of the statutory term ‘stationary source.’”135  The Court 
ruled that “[w]hen Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to 
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”136  The 
Court further ruled that “any ensuing regulation is binding on the 
courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”137  The courts have 
“long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is 
entrusted to administer.”138  The Court reasoned that  
it can still be apparent from the agency’s general 
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances 
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to 
speak with force of law when it addresses ambiguity in 
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one 
about one which Congress did not actually have an 
intent as to a particular result.139   
Because the statute is not ambiguous, the court in Naruto 
improperly deferred to the agency’s determination on the issue of 
whether an animal can own a copyright.140  As stated previously, the 
 
132 See generally id. at 137.  Despite the Court’s clear ruling that the power to determine 
legislative intent lies within the judiciary, the Copyright Office improperly seeks to interpret 
legislative intent in the Compendium. 
133 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2013). 
134 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
135 Id. at 840.  
136 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-
44.)  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 227-28. 
139 Id. at 229.  
140 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).  Author 
should be defined as broadly as possible.  Id.  Since the term author should be defined as 
broadly as possible, there should not be any ambiguity and the term should include all authors. 
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Supreme Court has determined in Burrow-Giles Lithographic that the 
term “author” should be interpreted as broadly as possible; thus, it is 
clear that the Supreme Court has already determined who an author is 
under the Copyright Act.141  The Court specifically limited the power 
of the U.S. Copyright Office to interpret a statute or regulation if it is 
ambiguous.142  This determination was further developed in 2013.143  
In City of Arlington v. F.C.C., the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine “whether an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity 
that concerns the scope of its regulatory authority is entitled to 
deference under Chevron.”144  The Court ruled that “if the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, that is the 
end of the matter.”145  The Court explained that statutory interpretation 
should only be evaluated by an agency if congressional intent is 
unclear.146  It is clear that Congress has repeatedly refused to define 
“author” since the enactment of the statute.147  Consequently, courts, 
like the Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic, have not explicitly held 
that “author” under the Copyright Act covers humans only.148  
Therefore, there is no ambiguity present that would trigger a need for 
an agency to interpret the statute under Chevron.  Because the agency 
lacked the authority to interpret the statute, courts should interpret the 
term “author” as broadly as possible, which would protect Naruto’s 
copyright in the Monkey Selfie.149  
The House of Representatives intended for the definition of 
author to remain broad when it reviewed the original Copyright Act of 
1909 for amendments in 1976.150  The purpose of this review was to 
provide for general revisions of the United States copyright laws.151  In 
the sectional analysis and discussion, the House of Representatives 
addressed section 102, which provides for the general subject matter 
 
141 Id.  Because the Court used the term as “broadly” as possible, it should be read to include 
every worldly entity, including animals. 
142 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)  
143 See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 290 (2013). 
144 Id. at 293. 
145 Id. at 307. 
146 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  
147 See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53.  Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. has not been overturned since its ruling. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). 
151 Id. at 47. 
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of copyright, more specifically, original works of authorship.152  The 
House intentionally left the phrase “original works of authorship” 
undefined to incorporate, without change, the standard originally 
established by the courts under the previous statute.153  The standard of 
originality did not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or 
esthetic merit, and there was no intention to change the standard to 
require more.154  The House further expressed that copyright law has 
been one of “gradual expansion” for new types of works that are 
afforded protection under the Act.155  The House stated that “the bill 
does not intend to either freeze the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter at the present stage of communication technology or to allow 
unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present 
congressional intent.”156  The scope of the bill is to protect all original 
works of authorship, and not to exclude any potential author from 
obtaining a copyright.  The House ended this section stating that 
although the coverage is very broad in its present state, “there are 
unquestionably other areas of existing subject matter that this bill does 
not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to.”157   
Throughout the entire House Committee Notes, the House 
never used words “human” or “animal.”158  As previously stated, the 
purpose was to make amendments to the Copyright Act to clarify 
certain terms; however, the House purposefully and specifically did 
not clarify that an author must be a human.159  Therefore, the House 
seemingly left the term undefined to incorporate any possible author, 
including animals.160  If Congress intended for humans to be the only 
authors protected under the Copyright Act, it had ample opportunity to 
amend or clarify its position.  Instead, it has demonstrated its intent 





152 Id. at 51. 
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
155 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 52. 
158 See generally id. 
159 Id. at 47. 
160 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION BY 
FOLLOWING THE RULING IN CETACEAN COMMUNITY V. BUSH 
In Naruto, the trial court relied on the decision in the Ninth 
Circuit case Cetacean Community v. Bush.161  The court refused to 
address the merits of the statutory violations because Naruto first 
needed to establish standing.162  The court claimed that Congress had 
not granted Naruto statutory standing because Cetacean Community 
ruled that animals do not have standing under the Copyright Act.163  
The judge erred in his decision because he mistakenly relied on the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Cetacean Community, which involved 
statutes that specifically required a human petitioner.164 
Cetacean Community was decided on October 20, 2004 by the 
Ninth Circuit.165  The sole plaintiff in this case was a self-appointed 
attorney representing all of the world’s whales, porpoises, and 
dolphins.166  The plaintiff alleged that the Navy had violated or would 
violate the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.167  The court ruled “it 
is obvious that an animal cannot function as a plaintiff in the same 
manner as a juridically competent human being.”168  The court 
followed with “[b]ut we see no reason why Article III prevents 
Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal.”169  The 
court compared animals to the likes of “infants, juveniles, and mental 
incompetents.”170  The court then went through each of the alleged 
statutes that the plaintiff claimed the Navy violated.171   
The court denied the plaintiff’s standing under the Endangered 
Species Act because the citizen-standing provision stated “any person 
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf.”172  The plaintiff in this 
matter was a human, but was not commencing the suit on his own 
 
161 Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (2018). 
162 Id. at *2-3. 
163 Id. at *3. 
164 Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004). 
165 See generally id. 
166 Id. at 1171. 
167 Id. at 1171-72. 
168 Id. at 1176. 
169 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1176-78. 
172 Id. at 1177. 
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behalf.173  The court then denied that the plaintiff had standing under 
the Administrative Procedure Act because section 10(a) of the statute 
required that the claim be brought by “[a] person suffering legal 
wrong.”174  The court finally denied that the plaintiff had standing 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act because the statute 
permitted “judicial review to any permit application, and to a ‘party’ 
opposed to such a permit.”175  When analyzing standing under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, the court deferred to the APA for 
its standing provisions because the statute lacked a provision regarding 
enforcement.176  The court had already determined that the plaintiff 
lacked standing under the APA, so it held the same way under the 
National Environmental Policy Act.177  The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that it had standing to bring the suit as an 
association under the APA because the Cetaceans failed to establish 
first-party organizational standing.178   
The court concluded that “if Congress and the President 
intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well 
as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so 
plainly.”179  This conclusion by the court fails for one reason.180  
Because Congress and the President did not plainly and explicitly state 
that animals lacked standing, they did not intend to limit the ability of 
animals to have standing.181  In fact, had Congress and the President 
intended to limit standing to persons only, they could have easily 
followed the language of the Endangered Species Act, which 
specifically limited standing to persons only.182   
Although Cetacean Community and Naruto both involved 
standing for animals that bring lawsuits, the facts of Naruto differ in 
such a way that Cetacean Community should not have been the basis 
for the trial court’s decision.183  First, Naruto is one Silver Crested 
 
173 Id. 
174 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176. 
175 Id. at 1178.  
176 Id. at 1176-77.  
177 Id. at 1179. 
178 Id.  First-party organizational standing is a form of association standing, which gives  
people standing to sue for another if they would have had the right to sue themselves.  
179 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179. 
180 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
181 See generally id. 
182 See generally Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169.  Each of the acts contains provisions that 
specifically limit standing to humans.  Id. 
183 Compare Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1, with Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1169. 
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Macaque, whereas the plaintiff in Cetacean Community sought to 
represent the entire world’s population of a species of animals with 
which he did not have a direct connection.184  In Naruto, the plaintiff 
had a personal connection with the monkey and sought to protect his 
rights only.185  Antje Englehardt personally knew and interacted with 
Naruto for Naruto’s entire life.186  PETA was an organization that 
promoted the ethical treatment of animals in four specific industries, 
one of which was the entertainment industry.187  Both parties that sued 
on behalf of Naruto were involved with animal protection and, 
specifically, with Naruto’s protection.188   
The court in Cetacean Community relied on the words of the 
statutes to deny the plaintiff in the case standing under the violated 
acts.189  The language of the Copyright Act does not limit statutory 
standing to just persons but instead expands it to all “authors.”190  The 
court in Naruto, citing the court in Cetacean Community, stated 
“Congress must make its intentions clear before the courts will 
construe a statute to confer standing on a particular plaintiff.”191  
Congress’s intention was clear in that it did not specifically deny 
standing to animals, thereby giving animals standing to bring lawsuits 
under the Copyright Act.192  However, the court in Naruto followed 
Cetacean Community and held that “the Copyright Act does not plainly 
extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to animals.”193  
In fact, the statute does not plainly confer the right to humans either, 
as the Ninth Circuit observed when it noted that the drafters of the 
statute intentionally left the term “author” and “works of authorship” 
“undefined to provide for some flexibility.”194  If courts were to follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Cetacean Community, no person or animal 
would have standing because Congress has not plainly conferred the 
protection to either party according to the plain meaning of the 
 
184 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1; Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1171. 
185 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
186 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 49, at *7. 
187 About PETA, PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/ (last visited June 28, 2018). 
188 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
189 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
190 Id. 
191 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2 (citing Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169). 
192 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
193 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *2.  
194 Id. 
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statute.195  This notion does not make sense because people do have 
protection, which exemplifies the court’s flawed reasoning in 
Cetacean Community. 
The judge in Naruto failed to properly evaluate the ruling in 
Cetacean Community and distinguish the facts in that case from the 
facts in Naruto.196  In Cetacean Community, the actual language of the 
acts stated that a person is required for standing to be granted.197  The 
plain language of the Copyright Act does not limit standing to just 
humans.198  Instead, the court relied on the Compendium, which is 
persuasive at best, and not binding.199 
Rather than following the flawed reasoning of the court in 
Cetacean Community, the court in Naruto should have followed the 
ruling in Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez.200  In this case, agencies 
representing the interest of the endangered right whale brought suit 
against the United States Department of Commerce seeking to reduce 
boat traffic in certain areas.201  Right whales were endangered due to 
over hunting and were protected by the United States government.202  
Heavy shipping traffic infiltrated the natural critical habitats for the 
right whales identified by the National Marine Fisheries Services.203  
Shipping traffic was the number one cause of right whale mortality and 
was causing the species to become extinct.204  The Defenders of 
Wildlife sued the Coast Guard, which was responsible for protecting 
the habitats of the right whales, for violation of the act that protected 
the endangered right whale.205  Specifically, the Coast Guard was 
accused of failing to consult with the Secretary of Commerce on 
effective means to protect the remaining population, and the Coast 
Guard failed to carry out programs that were designed to conserve the 
right whale population.206  Plaintiffs were granted standing on the basis 
 
195 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179.  
196 See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231.  The Court did not look at the standing required 
for each claim.  Id. 
197 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176-78.  
198 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
199 See generally COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41. 
200 Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
201 Id. at 914. 
202 Id. at 914-15. 
203 Id. at 915. 
204 Id. 
205 Defs. of Wildlife, 532 F.3d. at 914. 
206 Id. at 917. 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/20
2018 ANIMALS AND COPYRIGHTS 1371 
of causation and redressability.207  They successfully argued that the 
Coast Guard had the authority to take into account right whales when 
devising shipping traffic schemes, and thus a district court order could 
redress the plaintiff’s injury.208   
The injury in Naruto was the exploitation of Naruto’s original 
work of art.209  Similar to Defenders of Wildlife, the court should have 
found that the claim brought on behalf of Naruto satisfied all three 
elements of standing.210  The causation of the injury was clearly from 
Slater and Blurb, Inc.’s publishing Naruto’s work of art without his 
permission.211  Courts could have easily resolved the issue of 
redressability by granting Naruto copyright protection of his work of 
art.212 
VI. FUTURE COURTS SHOULD LOOK TOWARDS THE 
UNDERLYING MESSAGES CONVEYED IN THE SETTLEMENT 
REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
On September 11, 2017, Slater and PETA reached a settlement 
agreement which ended the lawsuit filed on Naruto’s behalf.213  The 
settlement included three aspects.214  First, Slater agreed to donate 
twenty-five percent of future revenue from the photos to groups that 
protect crested macaques and their habitat.215  Second, both parties 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit to dismiss its decision in Cetacean 
Community that animals cannot own a copyright.216  The third aspect 
of the settlement was not released to the public.217   
This settlement agreement is important for many reasons.218  
First, both parties agreed, in the end, that Naruto was entitled to a share 
 
207 Id. at 924-25. 
208 Id. at 917. 
209 See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231.  Defendant is profiting from the labor of the 
plaintiff without consent.  Id. 
210 Defs. of Wildlife, 532 F.3d at 923.  Standing requirements are injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability.  Id. 
211 See generally Naruto, 2016 WL 362231. 
212 Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.  Plaintiffs only sought to protect Naruto’s copyright; 
therefore, this injury could have been redressed by granting him the protection he deserved.  
213 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
214 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
215 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
216 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
217 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
218 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
23
Schneider: Animals and Copyrights
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1372 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
of the revenue.219  Second, both parties agreed that animals should have 
the ability to own a copyright.220  This settlement exemplifies the 
parties’ acceptance that an animal can own a copyright.  A settlement 
of the same structure could be adopted to be used in mediation, 
arbitration, and litigation.  If courts, the legislature, and the 
administrative agencies refuse to identify animals as parties that can 
seek copyright protection, this settlement structure can be offered as a 
model, and hence a workaround, to prevent the exploitation of animals 
while limiting the liability of humans.221  Unfortunately, the Ninth 
Circuit does not share this same sentiment.  
On April 23, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmatively ruled against 
Naruto.222  The Court determined that Naruto does not have standing 
under the Copyright Act for various reasons.  First, several provisions 
of the Copyright Act persuaded the court “that animals [do not] have 
statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act.”223  Second, the 
court reasoned that the use of the words “‘children’, ‘grandchildren’, 
‘legitimate’, ‘widow’ and ‘widower’ all imply humanity and 
necessarily exclude animals that do not marry and do not have heirs 
entitled to property by law.”224  This reasoning by the Ninth Circuit is 
overly narrow, as animals can have children, grandchildren, and have 
been known to mate for life.225  The court held that the “district court 
did not err in concluding that Naruto—and, more broadly, animals 
other than humans—lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright 
Act.”226   
VII. THE COPYRIGHT ACT PROVIDES A WAY FOR REGISTRATION 
OF A COPYRIGHT FOR AN ANIMAL 
The Copyright Act includes a provision for unknown or 
anonymous authors of a work.227  Section 409 of the Copyright Act 
 
219 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
220 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
221 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
222 Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).  
223 Id. at 426. 
224 Id. 
225 Penguins have been known to mate for life, which is significantly similar to marriage.  
226 Naruto, 888 F.3d at 426.  
227 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2016). 
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describes the requirements for the application for copyright 
registration.228  This section states: 
The application for copyright registration shall be made 
on a form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and 
shall include: 
(1) the name and address of the copyright claimant;  
(2) in the case of a work other than an anonymous or 
pseudonymous work, the name and nationality or 
domicile of the author or authors, and, if one or more of 
the authors is dead, the dates of their death; 
(3) if the work is anonymous or pseudonymous, the 
nationality or domicile of the author or authors; 
(4) in the case of a work made for hire, a statement to 
this effect; 
(5) if the copyright claimant is not the author, a brief 
statement of how the claimant obtained ownership of 
the copyright; 
(6) the title of the work, together with any previous or 
alternative titles under which the work can be 
identified; 
(7) the year in which creation of the work was 
completed.229 
Specifically, subsections 2 and 3 provide ways for registration 
for works of art that are anonymous as long as the nationality or the 
domicile of the author is provided.230  Further, a person close to Naruto 
could file on his behalf under subsection 5 by claiming it is filing on 
behalf of the original owner who wishes to remain anonymous.231  All 
the other information such as the year of creation and title of the 
creation are known to the parties.232  The Copyright Act protects 
registration of works by anonymous authors.  Therefore, Naruto should 
have been granted a copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2) and (3).233 
 
228 Id. 
229 § 409(1)-(7). 
230 § 409(2)-(3). 
231 § 409(5). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Should an animal, regardless of its intelligence, be afforded the 
same copyright protections as those conferred on a human?  The 
Copyright Act does not explicitly exclude an animal from being 
considered an author.234  The Supreme Court has had many 
opportunities to limit the definition of “author” to humans only, but it 
has consistently refused to limit the definition.235  Furthermore, the 
House of Representatives specifically stated that it left the term 
“author” undefined to broadly encompass all.  Why should a court 
reject an animal’s ability to own a copyright if Congress itself has not 
expressly denied such a right?  The simple, logical, and just answer is 
that courts should not deny such protection to animals.  
There are complexities when deciding the proper remedies for 
an animal whose copyright has been violated.236  Animals can be 
analogized to minors based on their incompetency, and the animal’s 
rights could be protected in a similar manner to a minor’s rights by a 
court-appointed guardian for the animal.  A court would have to 
appoint a guardian, but generally speaking, the guardian could be the 
party that moved to defend the animal’s rights.  The settlement reached 
by the parties in Naruto237 may reflect a societal sentiment that animals 
should have copyright protection of their works of art.  Courts could 
grant animals partial compensation to be used either for the animals’ 
benefit or for the benefit of the entire species.  There is no reason why 
an animal, regardless of its intelligence, should not be granted the same 
protection afforded to a human.  As such, Naruto deserved the 
protection that it received in the settlement, and the courts and the 
legislatures should explicitly recognize the validity of such protection.  
 
 
234 See generally id. § 101.  
235 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 41. 
236 While animals and humans are similar, animals cannot manage their money.  Most 
animals do not have a need for money, a common remedy in a lawsuit.  The money they do 
win can be used to benefit their species, but still requires a person to handle its management 
of that money.   
237 Slotkin, supra note 50. 
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